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In his defense of a version of what I have called ‘the ubiquity thesis’ – the idea that every 
narrative fiction contains an overarching fictional narrator – Peter Alward gives a helpful 
reconstruction of some of my arguments against that thesis and clearly lays out a part of 
the theoretical terrain on which this debate takes place.1 However, by the end of the piece 
he is offering solace to both me and those I was arguing against, which is about as close 
as philosophers come to fightin’ words. 
 Alward is in a position to offer solace to both sides in the original debate since he 
argues for a middle way. According to Alward, though it is not the case that there is a 
fictional narrator of every narrative fiction, there is a non-actual narrator of every 
narrative fiction. The non-actual comprises more than just the fictional, so some narrative 
fictions have fictional narrators, while others have non-actual narrators of another sort. 
Moreover, a work’s narrator is always a fact-teller, on Alward’s view. Thus, my solace is 
that the original ubiquity thesis is false, while my opponents’ solace is that a close variant 
of it is true. Stories with ordinary first-person fictional narrators, reliable or otherwise, 
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such as David Copperfield, are covered by Alward’s new ubiquity thesis, as they were by 
the original ubiquity thesis – they have non-actual (fictional) fact-telling narrators. Stories 
that are narrated in a plain, omniscient third-person style, such as my central example of 
Graham Greene’s The Heart of the Matter, which I take simply to be told by their actual 
authors, and thus counterexamples to the original ubiquity thesis, Alward argues are not 
simply told by their authors, but are (also) narrated by some non-actual (but non-
fictional), fact-telling agency. 
 There are two main concerns I have with Alward’s view. One is with the nature of 
the new kind of narrator he appeals to – the non-actual, non-fictional fact-teller. The other 
is with his argument for the existence of such agents in all narrative fictions that do not 
have a fictional narrator. I will address Alward’s argument first, and then the coherence 
of his alternative theory that non-actual, non-fictional, fact-telling narrators can do the 
work the original ubiquity theorists assigned to fictional narrators. 
 It is useful to approach Alward’s category of non-actual, non-fictional fact-tellers 
by way of the category of non-actual, non-fictional fiction-tellers. He gives the example 
of the idealized author-figures invoked by some theories of interpretation.2 The sense in 
which these figures are non-actual is pretty obvious – you won’t meet one of them on the 
street. But the sense in which they are non-fictional is less so. On the one hand, these 
figures are not part of the fictional world of the work. None of the work’s characters will 
meet the implied author on any fictional street.3 But on the other hand, presumably what 
we are supposed to do when we engage with a work of fiction, according to these theories 
of interpretation, is something like to imagine an author with semantic intentions that 
would have been best carried out by the production of just such a work as the one in 
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hand. This muddies the distinction between Alward’s two categories of non-actual tellers, 
since if we ought to imagine a certain person, then that person is a fictional being, 
according to one popular theory of fiction.4 Nonetheless, perhaps the distinction between 
being and not being a member of the fictional world of the work is enough to ground the 
distinction to which Alward appeals. 
Now, what is the argument that is supposed to convince us that a work of fiction 
must have a non-actual fact-telling narrator? Alward defends what he calls the ‘doxastic 
argument’. We agree on its second premise: There are no actual fact-tellers of literary 
narratives. But we seem to disagree on its first premise.5 Alward believes that 
“[u]nderstanding a literary narrative requires the supposition that it is told by a fact-
teller” (??). His argument for this premise appeals to the theory of pragmatic implicature. 
The maxim he uses as an illustration is one of Grice’s maxims of quality: Do not say 
what you believe to be false. He points out that this maxim 
does not govern fiction-telling discourse because there is simply no expectation that 
fiction-tellers believe what they say; thus fictional-tellers simply cannot 
pragmatically impart anything by means of it. Only a fact-teller – who is obligated to 
say only what she believes – could generate implicatures by such means. As a result, 
if unexpressed fictional truths are generated by pragmatic implicature – and what 
other option is there? – then they can be discerned only by supposing (or imagining) 
that the text is told by a fact-teller. (??) 
There is an odd disconnection between the maxim Alward uses as an illustration and the 
aspect of our understanding of fiction that he focuses on. As Alward says, the nature of 
the fictional world of a particular work goes beyond “the propositions expressed by the 
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sentences which constitute it” (??). Taking The Heart of the Matter as a central example 
again, it is true in the world of that work that the “bald pink knees” what Wilson thrusts 
against the ironwork at the beginning of the novel are in the middle of his legs, and not 
on his forehead (as the result of an unfortunate genetic condition that goes unmentioned 
throughout the rest of the novel), nor prostheses on sticks that he carries around for some 
troubling psychological reason. But this is not a matter of the maxim of quality Alward 
mentions. It is a matter of something like what Kendall Walton calls the Reality 
Principle: 
If p1…, pn are the propositions whose fictionality a representation generates 
directly, another proposition, q, is fictional in it if, and only if, were it the case 
that p1…, pn, it would be the case that q.6 
Walton shows that this principle is defeasible, and that it is not sufficient as an answer to 
the question Alward raises – at the very least there are other principles in play, such as 
the Mutual Belief Principle that Walton goes on to discuss next.7 But Walton and others 
agree that some versions of these principles are clearly in play in our understanding of 
much fiction. Thus we have a pretty widely held alternative theory with which to respond 
to Alward’s apparently rhetorical question: What option other than pragmatic implicature 
is there for the generation of unexpressed fictional truths? The Reality Principle, among 
others. 
Alward notes that “[o]ne might, of course, argue that there are a separate set of 
conversational principles governing fiction-telling. But without independent evidence for 
such principles, this manoeuvre is ad hoc” (??, n. 22). The evidence is simply how we 
understand fictions, which is clearly different from how we understand non-fictional 
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narratives. Some principles that govern our production of and interaction with fictions 
will doubtless be related to some principles of ordinary conversational pragmatic 
implicature. For instance, there is surely a fictional counterpart of the maxim of quality 
Alward mentions: Do not tell what the audience ought not to imagine. The Reality 
Principle itself seems to be related to the maxims of quantity: (i) Be as informative as 
required, and (ii) be no more informative than is required.8 And the whole enterprise is 
governed by a close variant of the Cooperative Principle: Make your linguistic 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose 
or direction of the discourse in which you are engaged.9 But despite these similarities, 
there is enough difference between the purpose and rules governing fictional discourse 
and conversation for the latter to require its own theory. Think only of the Mutual Belief 
Principle, which says that that is implicitly fictional which would be believed in the 
artist’s culture to be implied by what is explicitly fictional.10 This is more distant from 
any rule of conversational implicature than the previous examples. Any theory of fiction 
which appeals to such principles will only count as ad hoc if it is posited to save a theory 
that does a worse job of explaining narrative fiction, all things considered, than Alward’s. 
 So, I don’t think Alward gives us a convincing argument for his revised ubiquity 
thesis. If you’re not convinced by my criticisms of his argument, though, the view he is 
defending should give you pause. He claims that narrative fictions without fictional 
narrators at least have non-actual fact-telling narrators. That is, such fictions have 
narrators that occupy neither the actual world, nor the fictional world of the work, but 
some other world, and that those narrators tell us facts about the fictional world of the 
work. How can one be a fact-teller about a world one does not occupy? Alward gives us 
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the example of actual people making claims about the afterlife. I don’t find this a very 
helpful example. It’s not clear that we should consider heaven, if it exists, non-actual. 
Think of a theist’s response to a claim that since God exists outside space and time She 
doesn’t actually exist. Rather than settle these claims, though, perhaps we can consider 
some less contentious examples. 
It seems that we sometimes make true claims about other possible worlds, for 
instance when I say what would have happened if I hadn’t caught the crystal goblet 
before it hit the concrete floor. It seems reasonable to describe this as a case of my telling 
you a fact (that you probably already know) about some possible world. It is a nice 
question how we could know about the possible (but non-actual), in part because it is a 
nice question what the possible (but non-actual) is, and how it is related to the actual, but 
it is relatively uncontroversial that we do know something about the possible. We can 
thus make sense of a possible person telling some fact about some world other than the 
one he inhabits. I might tell you that if I had been illustrating counterfactual claims in a 
possible world where I failed to catch the glass, I would have used a different 
counterfactual in my illustration. That possible person (my counterpart) would have thus 
been saying something about a different possible world than the one he inhabits. This is 
perhaps a less controversial example, then, of a non-actual teller of facts about a world he 
doesn’t occupy. So, I agree with Alward that such narrators are possible in principle.  
Let us now turn to fiction. It’s easier to see how we can make true claims about 
the fictional, as opposed to the possible, since it’s easier to see how the fictional is rooted 
in the actual. Somehow, by writing certain things down in a certain situation (or saying 
things, or throwing shadows on a screen, or getting images on celluloid, or whatever), 
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actual people determine what is the case in some fictional world. This is uncontroversial, 
I take it. We implicitly understand roughly how this works, and thus we can report true 
claims about fictional worlds, such as that Wilson is in Africa. In a sense, then, we might 
say that I tell you a fact when I tell you that Wilson is in Africa, though it is a fact about a 
fictional world, just as I tell you a fact about a possible world when I tell you what would 
have happened had I not caught the goblet. But this is not the kind of fact-telling that 
Alward has in mind. He is contrasting fact-telling to fiction-telling, which is what actual 
authors and some fictional characters do. This makes it difficult to see what his non-
actual tellers of facts about fictional worlds are doing, though. It is true, as Alward says, 
that one can tell facts about worlds other than the actual world, but there are two very 
different kinds of things going on depending on whether the world being described is 
possible or fictional. Moreover, it is unclear what relation holds between the world of his 
non-actual, non-fictional narrators and their respective fictional worlds. Thus there seems 
to be at least an equivocation in his argument. If it is the sense in which we can tell facts 
about fictional worlds that is relevant, Alward’s non-actual, non-fictional fact-telling 
narrators are otiose. Authors are unimpeachably positioned to tell us the facts about the 
fictional worlds they create. But if it is the sense in which we can tell facts about possible 
worlds that is relevant, Alward’s argument is unsound. For there is no reason to suppose 
that there are some non-actual beings ‘out there’ somewhere who are epistemically 
related to fictional worlds the way we are epistemically related to possible worlds. 
Let me approach this issue from one last direction. There are unproblematic 
fictions narrated in the first person, such as David Copperfield. Alward (like the ubiquity 
theorists) has no problem with saying that such novels are constructed by an actual 
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author, and narrated by a fictional character. By virtue of the way the novel is constructed 
and the novelistic conventions we are familiar with, we take the sentences the author 
writes to make it the case that, fictionally, David Copperfield is telling his life story. The 
question is why we cannot say exactly the same sort of thing for unproblematic fictions 
narrated in the third-person. By virtue of the way The Heart of the Matter is constructed, 
and the novelistic conventions we are familiar with, we take the sentences the author 
writes to make it the case that, fictionally, Wilson sits on the balcony of the Bedford 
Hotel, his bald pink knees thrust against the ironwork. Such a theory, whereby actual 
authors are allowed to be narrators of their fictions, tellers of their stories, posits less 
ontologically and psychologically than either of the alternatives (the traditional ubiquity 
thesis or Alward’s revised version) yet, for all I can see, does the same work. There is no 
reason to posit non-actual narrators in all narrative fictions, be they fictional or otherwise. 
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